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INTRODUCTION
Economic consultant Peter Bernstein asks, “What is it that distinguishes the
thousands of years of history from what we think of as modern times?”1 His
answer is “the mastery of risk.”2 Bernstein argues:
The ability to define what may happen in the future and to choose among
alternatives lies at the heart of contemporary societies. Risk management
guides us over a vast range of decision-making, from allocating wealth to
safeguarding public health, from waging war to planning a family, from
paying insurance premiums to wearing a seatbelt, from planting corn to
marketing cornflakes.3
However saturated modern society may be with risk calculations, law prac-
tice has come rather late to the table. What Anthony Davis calls the “cottage
industry model” of practice created resistance to the adoption of business
techniques such as risk management for many years, even as economic realities
transformed law firms into major economic enterprises.4 Animated by the
cottage industry vision, lawyers have sought jealously to guard their individual
independence, notwithstanding the increasingly collective and interdependent
nature of their practices.5
The increasing embrace of risk management by law firms that Professor
Alfieri describes6 thus may seem to be the long overdue entry of law practice
into the modern world. Indeed, as I will suggest, there are valuable benefits that
flow from this development. Professor Alfieri is right to insist, however, that we
examine more closely the assumptions and sensibilities that are associated with
this conception of ethics.7 As he suggests, there are some features of risk
management that may be in tension with a robust notion of lawyers’ ethical
responsibilities. This is because rules designed to avoid acting unethically may
1. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 1 (1996).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 2.
4. ANTHONY E. DAVIS, RISK MANAGEMENT: SURVIVAL TOOLS FOR LAW FIRMS 5 (1995). A cottage
industry model conceptualizes a law firm as an umbrella encompassing a cluster of decentralized
practices controlled by relatively autonomous lawyers and practice groups. Id.
5. Id.; see Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties, and the Values of Professional-
ism, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 61 (1999) (“[C]ategorical resistance to competition penalties implicitly
reflects an individualistic model of law practice that is at odds with the fact that most modern legal
services are provided through team production.”).
6. Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise of Risk Management, 94 GEO. L.J. 1909
(2006).
7. For insightful exploration of the implications for lawyers of the adoption of a risk management
perspective in the corporate world, see Robert Eli Rosen, Risk Management and Corporate Gover-
nance: The Case of Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1157 (2003); Robert Eli Rosen, “We’re All Consultants
Now”: How Change in Client Organization Strategies Influences Change in the Organization of
Corporate Legal Services, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 637 (2002).
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not necessarily inspire a motivation to act ethically.8
Appreciating this tension should lead us to consider the insights that we can
gain from research on the psychological dynamics of behavior within organiza-
tions. In particular, we should attend to the considerable body of work that
attempts to apply the findings of this research to the operation of corporate legal
compliance programs. In many ways, these programs are the model for law
firms’ current efforts to establish an ethical infrastructure of policies, proce-
dures, and rules designed to promote ethical conduct.9 An analysis of corporate
programs suggests that companies struggle with a similar tension when devising
and operating programs intended to ensure employees’ compliance with the law.
In particular, they must take into account the complex relationship between
program characteristics on the one hand and employee perceptions, motivations,
and sensibilities on the other.10 Law firms instituting risk management programs
may profit from the lessons that corporations have learned from efforts to
ensure legal compliance within large organizations.
In the material that follows, I will first situate the risk management paradigm
within the evolution in bar ethics regulation, from reliance on aspirations to an
emphasis on enforceable rules. I will then discuss the consistency of risk
management with research in moral psychology suggesting the powerful influ-
ence of situational factors on conduct. I devote most of the remainder of this
Essay to a description of the different effects of instrumental and normative
approaches on ethical and legal compliance. This includes a discussion of the
differences between deterrence-based and integrity-based programs. I conclude
with some suggestions about the implications of research on and experience
with corporate compliance programs for law firms.
I can highlight in this Essay only a bare handful of issues that the work I
describe raises and merely speculate on the possible salience of these issues for
law firms. In addition, I offer only a few suggestions on how the distinctiveness
of law practice may affect the value of what we can learn from corporate
compliance efforts. My hope, however, is to encourage greater attention to the
lessons that corporate experience may offer for our attempts to promote ethical
behavior of lawyers in an age in which law practice has become big business.
I. ASPIRATIONS, RULES, AND CHARACTER
A. INITIAL ASPIRATIONS
For most of the twentieth century, the ethical provisions that governed
8. See Alfieri, supra note 6, at 1910 (“[W]idespread adoption of risk management mechanisms . . . ac-
tually diminishes the appreciation of moral choices facing lawyers in practice . . . .”).
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in
Large Law Firms: A Call for Research and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691 (2002); Ted Schneyer, A
Tale of Four Systems: Reflections on How Law Influences the “Ethical Infrastructure” of Law Firms,
39 S. TEX. L. REV. 245 (1998).
10. See infra Part IV.
2006] 1959RISKY BUSINESS
lawyers included a substantial component that expressed non-enforceable aspira-
tions for lawyers’ conduct. The American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of
Professional Ethics, promulgated in 1908, spoke in expansive terms. For in-
stance, Canon 15 provided that the lawyer, in pressing his client’s cause, “must
obey his own conscience and not that of his client.”11 Canon 16 stated that a
lawyer should restrain his clients from “doing those things which the lawyer
himself ought not to do.”12 Similarly, Canon 32 provided that a lawyer’s duty in
the last analysis includes impressing upon his client “exact compliance with the
strictest principles of moral law.”13
The 1969 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, which replaced the
1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, contained Canons, Ethical Considerations,
and Disciplinary Rules.14 Only the latter, however, could serve as the basis for
enforcement action by the state bar association. The Canons, the Code said, “are
statements of axiomatic norms, expressing in general terms the standards of
professional conduct expected of lawyers in their relationships with the public,
with the legal system, and with the legal profession.”15 The Ethical Consider-
ations, the Code continued, “are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive. They
constitute a body of principles upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in
many specific situations.”16
B. THE ADVENT OF RULES
Criticism of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as unwieldy and
disjointed, combined with the growing diversification and fragmentation of the
bar, led to its replacement by the ABA in 1983 with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.17 Today, the vast majority of states have ethical provi-
sions based on the Model Rules.18 These rules abandon any focus on aspira-
tions, eliminating the Canons and Ethical Considerations in favor of enforceable
rules. Much like statutes, the rules announce minimum standards of conduct
below which lawyers may not fall on pain of punishment. That punishment may
11. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1908), reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STAT-
UTES AND STANDARDS 222–23 (Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon eds., 2006) [hereinafter REGULATION OF
LAWYERS].
12. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 16 (1908), reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS, supra
note 11, at 33.
13. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1908), reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS, supra
note 11, at 33.
14. See REGULATION OF LAWYERS, supra note 11, at 537.
15. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Preliminary Statement (1983), reprinted in REGULATION OF
LAWYERS, supra note 11, at 540–41.
16. Id.
17. See Theodore Schneyer, Professionalism as Politics: The Making of a Modern Legal Ethics
Code, in LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION
95 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (providing an interesting account of the political maneuvering
among different segments of the bar with respect to various provisions of the code).
18. See REGULATION OF LAWYERS, supra note 11, at 3.
1960 [Vol. 94:1957THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
include either disciplinary action or the use of rule violations as evidence in
lawsuits brought against the lawyer.
This evolution in emphasis reflects diminishing confidence that there is
enough consensus about professional ideals to make hortatory proclamation an
effective means of regulating conduct. Rather than rely on self-constraint
animated by lawyers’ internalization of common values, ethical provisions now
purport to announce in advance what conduct is permitted and what is prohib-
ited. Armed with this notice, lawyers can order their professional lives accord-
ingly and stay out of trouble. As Tanina Rostain has put it, “[t]he transition from
Code to Rules marked a fundamental shift in expectations for legal ethics. In
essence, the organized bar relinquished the ambition of articulating a unified
statement of professional ideas in favor of clearly stating the enforceable legal
obligations of lawyers.”19
This type of regulatory regime is designed to reduce reliance on individual
discretion in promoting ethical conduct. Lawyers must still exercise discretion,
of course, in determining when a rule applies, what it requires, and what, if any,
exceptions to it are applicable. In contrast to the prior regime, however,
professional ethical deliberation is supposed to consist mostly of following rules
rather than open-ended reflection on competing values.20
C. CHARACTER AND RULE COMPLIANCE
The Model Rules reflect ambivalence about the role of character in producing
ethical conduct. On the one hand, more precisely drawn rules reduce the need to
rely on individual character because, to act ethically, the lawyer need only
engage in the relatively narrow exercise of rule interpretation. Furthermore, we
might suspect that professional training will tend to lead lawyers to take a
“technocratic” approach to interpretation, which is guided by the outcome that
the lawyer seeks to achieve rather than a more expansive assessment of the
values expressed by legal rules.21
On the other hand, the Rules are directed at individual lawyers and, for the
most part, address those lawyers as individuals apart from whatever settings in
which they practice. The implicit message is that ethical lapses ultimately are
19. Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1280 (1998).
20. The section on the Scope of the Rules cautions, “The Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral
and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be
completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of
law.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope, reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS, supra note 11, at
12. The ABA offers no indication, however, of what these moral and ethical considerations might be,
presumably leaving their identification to the conscience of individual lawyers rather than to any
collective effort on the part of the profession.
21. See Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?,
69 S. CAL. L. REV. 885, 886 (1996) (“In particular, I argue that [a technocratic] mode of lawyering
discourages, and may even entirely thwart, a certain sentimental responsiveness integral to genuine
ethical deliberation.”)
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attributable to individual weakness or mendacity—in other words, a problem
with character. This focus on individual character is reflected in the ABA’s 1986
report “. . . In the Spirit of Public Service”: A Blueprint for the Rekindling of
Lawyer Professionalism. “The public views lawyers,” the report says, “at best,
as being of uneven character and quality.”22 The Commission expressed its
belief that “most lawyers . . . are conscientious, fair, and able. They serve their
clients well and are a credit to the profession. Yet the practices of some lawyers
cry out for correction.” 23
D. CHARACTER AND RISK MANAGEMENT
The increasing focus on risk management in law firms and legal departments
that Professor Alfieri describes can be seen as consistent with the evolution
from aspirations to rules. Risk management attempts to put in place a set of
standard policies and procedures that minimize individual discretion and empha-
size uniform responses to specific situations. The occurrence of a particular
contingency—such as an inquiry about representation by a potential client—
should trigger the same response in every case—such as conducting a conflicts
check. Risk management provisions are rules designed to avoid violating other
rules, such as state bar provisions, state and federal statutes, regulations, and the
like. The idea is that rule compliance will ultimately beget rule compliance.
Risk management reflects less ambivalence than do the Model Rules, how-
ever, about the role of individual character. The focus of risk management is on
the organizational context in which lawyers practice and how that shapes
behavior. Its emphasis on compliance with provisions one step removed from
rules of conduct de-emphasizes character and highlights circumstance. Refer-
ring a conflicts matter to a committee, for instance, reduces the need to rely on
the ability of an individual lawyer to resist temptation. Similarly, requiring a
second signature on an opinion letter from a lawyer not working on a matter
makes the firm less dependent on the probity of the first lawyer. The objective is
to manipulate circumstances in order to reduce the probability of failures of
character.
On this view, the individual lawyer is a dependent variable in a complex
chain of causal influences. Shifting the strength and weakness of certain of these
influences should make her more likely to act in a particular way. This is a
model in which behavior is less a product of individual will than of the stimuli
to which a lawyer is subjected. Indeed, the exercise of discretion is subversive
of uniformity, so subjectivity is discouraged.
In many respects, this is a salutary shift in focus. It is not surprising, for
instance, that law firms have focused more on risk management as they have
22. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE”: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, reprinted in DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID
LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS 38 (4th ed. 2004).
23. Id.
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become more bureaucratic business enterprises. Several studies underscore the
crucial role of organizational environment in influencing the behavior of actors
within bureaucratic settings.24 Spurred both by the insights from these studies
and the rewards available under certain regulatory regimes, numerous corpora-
tions have established legal compliance regimes in recent years. Indeed, provid-
ing advice on the creation and maintenance of such programs has become a
major industry.
As law firms have become larger and more geographically dispersed, as well
as more explicitly profit-oriented, it makes sense that they would learn from
business organizations attempting to place ethical constraints on profit-seeking
behavior. Given that firms now contain an increasing diversity of practice
specialties, fill more of their partner ranks through lateral hiring, and often
employ lawyers of differing national backgrounds and cultures, it is more
difficult to assume a consensus on professional values among members of the
firm. The result may be that the importance of attaining financial objectives is
the default consensus. Firms therefore are more likely to emphasize rule compli-
ance than professional discretion as the foundation for ethical conduct.
II. RISK MANAGEMENT AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
Risk management is also consistent with a growing body of research on
ethical behavior outside of organizational contexts. This research has been
described as “situationist.”25 It challenges the notion that ethical behavior is
primarily the work of good character, conceptualized as an integrated set of
dispositions that operates across a wide variety of circumstances. Situationism
instead suggests that behavior is highly context-dependent and often differs
based on what seem to be trivial differences between one situation and another.
Someone who is faithful to a spouse, for instance, may nonetheless embezzle
money from an employer; someone who is willing to stop on the highway to
help a stranger with a flat tire may not stop while on foot to help a stranger who
appears to be ill. Myriad circumstantial factors make it hazardous to predict
behavior in one setting based on behavior in another. On this view, rather than
speak of character in a global sense, we should think of it in disaggregated
terms, as dispositions to act in certain ways under certain circumstances.
This perspective implies that, rather than trying to develop characters that
will determine behavior regardless of the situation, we should attend more to
features of our environment that influence conduct. As philosopher John Doris
24. See, e.g., CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS 46 (David M. Messick
& Ann E. Tenbrunsel eds., 1996) (suggesting “a perspective of ‘command responsibility’ and an
emphasis on the various duties of individuals, including the duty not to overlook harm, and the duty to
carry out positional responsibilities”); Harvey S. James, Jr., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making
Through Organizational Structure, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 43 (2000) (examining how a firm’s organizational
structure affects the ethical behavior of workers).
25. JOHN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL BEHAVIOR 1 (2002). Doris’s book
contains an extensive discussion of much of this body of work.
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states, situationism “reminds us that the world is a morally dangerous place.”26
Confidence in character can put people at risk in morally dangerous situations
because it can lead them to overestimate their ability to resist circumstantial
pressures. Rather than simply attempting to strengthen resolve, we should
instead, or in addition, try to avoid putting ourselves in situations that test it.
John Doris illustrates this point with the example of someone who is invited
to dinner by a flirtatious colleague when his spouse is out of town. Rather than
accept the invitation on the assumption that he has a virtuous enough character
to resist temptation, a more realistic person might conclude that prudence
suggests he decline the invitation in the first place.27 The factors that determine
our ethical success or failure thus “often emerge earlier in an activity than might
be thought.”28 This means that we may be less ethically responsible for failing
to resist powerful pressures than for putting ourselves in situations where we
will encounter them. “Only by being aware of the situational threats to responsi-
bility can we act as responsible persons in as many situations as possible.”29 By
providing a better understanding of the determinants of behavior, situationism
may foster “a process of self-manipulation that allows people to take a more
active and responsible role” in their lives.30
An emphasis on risk management reflects this focus. The establishment of
certain policies and procedures is designed to create circumstances that mini-
mize the probability of undesirable conduct and maximize the probability of
good. A sound risk management program identifies what are most likely to be
occasions of temptation and attempts to adopt measures that reduce their
potency. As situationism recommends, it focuses on a point earlier in the causal
chain than the ultimate ethically significant decision.
The rise of risk management, thus, is commendable insofar as it recognizes
the importance to ethical conduct of situational influences in general and
organizational influences in particular. Its implicit account of lawyers’ behavior
represents a sophisticated advance over appeals that focus on individual charac-
ter and values.
The insights of situationism do not mean, however, that character is irrelevant
to producing ethical conduct. While we may be skeptical of accounts of
character that are meant to hold true globally, the situationist acknowledges that
narrower dispositions and attitudes can play a role in how people respond to
different circumstances. We need not be full Skinnerians, subscribing to the
notion that human conduct is simply the end result of stimulus and response.31
Humans must still confront the “burdens of moral agency,”32 exercise discre-
26. Id. at 146.
27. Id. at 147.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 153.
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM (1976).
32. Alfieri, supra note 6, at 1911.
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tion, cultivate judgment, and be prepared to accept some responsibility for their
actions. Situationism maintains that greater attention to the impact of circum-
stances suggests that responsibility may lie not simply at what seems the final
moment of decision, but for conduct at an earlier point in the sequence of
events.
As an example, consider John Gellene’s assumption of responsibility for
representing South Street in what was known as the Busse matter.33 At the time,
Gellene also was representing Bucyrus-Erie in preparing for its bankruptcy.
Since South Street was the major secured creditor of Bucyrus, this dual represen-
tation created the potential for a conflict of interest. In addition, Gellene and
Milbank’s work for South Street was a “connection” that would have to be
disclosed under bankruptcy rules when Gellene applied for appointment as
Bucyrus’ counsel when that company filed its bankruptcy petition.
It is appropriate to hold Gellene responsible for failing to disclose this
connection to the court when it came time to do so. We also may be justified,
however, in holding him responsible for accepting the representation of South
Street in the first place. When Milbank partner Larry Lederman called Gellene
to discuss the Busse matter, Lederman asked Gellene whether Milbank’s corpo-
rate practice group should handle it or whether the bankruptcy group of which
Gellene was a part should do so. Gellene responded that lawyers in the
bankruptcy group should do the work under his supervision.34 In other words,
Gellene actively sought the assignment.
Whether the corporate or bankruptcy group did the work on the Busse case,
Milbank would have a potential conflict of interest and a connection to South
Street that ultimately would have to be disclosed to the bankruptcy court.
Gellene’s personal involvement in the matter, however, would create an espe-
cially acute potential for conflict, and disclosing his work on Busse to the
bankruptcy court would be especially likely to lead to his disqualification.
There is a strong argument, therefore, that Gellene should have anticipated he
might find making the required disclosure especially difficult when he eventu-
ally applied to represent Bucyrus in its bankruptcy. He should have taken this
into account when he decided to tell Lederman that the bankruptcy group
should handle the Busse matter. In light of this, he can be blamed not simply for
failing to make the proper disclosure but also for knowingly placing himself in
circumstances in which this was a likely outcome. To the extent that Gellene
sought the South Street representation in the belief that robust character traits
would enable him to resist temptation when the time came for disclosure, he
was misguided and placed himself at significant ethical risk. In retrospect,
simply suggesting that the corporate group handle the Busse matter would have
been wiser. Therefore, situationism properly understood leaves room for the
operation of character and the exercise of informed discretion.
33. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 322–23 (2004).
34. Id. at 323.
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III. RISK MANAGEMENT AND ETHICAL MOTIVES
One reason that character still matters in a risk management regime is that
any system of rules, no matter how comprehensive, still leaves occasions calling
for discretion. Determining when a rule applies, what features of the situation
are salient to its application, and how it should be reconciled with other
arguably relevant rules requires judgment that itself is not reducible to follow-
ing a set of rules. How one engages in this process will be shaped to some
degree by the dispositions, attitudes, and motives one brings to the task.
A. THE INSTRUMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICS
Professor Alfieri’s caution about an emphasis on risk management highlights
the point that conceptualizing ethics as a matter of avoiding liability can
influence these dispositions, attitudes, and motives, and, therefore, how some-
one exercises her discretion. The possible emergence of an instrumental ap-
proach to legal rules is an especially important concern. Risk management
conceives of ethical and legal provisions as a minefield of potential sources of
liability. Policies and procedures adopted under its banner are aimed at reducing
the probability that anyone will make a misstep that results in detonation. The
person for whom ethics is synonymous only with risk management, therefore,
may tend to approach the law as does Holmes’s “bad man,” who “cares only for
the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict,”35 and
not any moral ends that the law is designed to serve. Such persons will try to
avoid punishment but will have no sense that breaking the law is a moral
offense.
For someone who adopts this perspective, law is an obstacle to the achieve-
ment of personal ends, which imposes a “cost” or “price” on efforts to attain
them. Ruthlessly following this theory to its conclusion, legal compliance is a
matter not of obeying commands with intrinsic normative value, but adding the
prospect of liability to the scales when weighing the costs and benefits of
different courses of action.
This instrumental approach to rule compliance is insufficient to ensure ro-
bustly ethical conduct because its motives for compliance are relatively shallow
and contingent. If violating a rule on a given occasion seems to promise more
benefits than costs, then Holmes’s bad man may stray. Rules, whether narrowly
or broadly phrased, will not impose meaningful constraints on lawyers who do
not have underlying commitment to moral force of the law. They will be able to
devise strategies that eliminate or circumvent legal obstacles that arise for
clients.36 In addition, of course, a system dependent solely on instrumental
motives also can be extremely costly because of the need for extensive monitor-
35. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, reprinted in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 171
(Harold J. Laski ed., 1920).
36. Rostain, supra note 19, at 1335.
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ing.37
A belief in the legitimacy and value of rules is a motive that appears to be
more robust in ensuring compliance. If the rules are regarded as instantiations of
ethical norms, then the desire to act ethically can move an individual to comply
even in the absence of monitoring or the likelihood of sanctions for noncompli-
ance. In such instances, the actor is moved by an internalized sense of obliga-
tion rather than a calculation of the costs and benefits of compliance.38
Furthermore, a person animated by this motive is more likely to conceive of
ethics not simply as rule compliance but as fidelity to broader principles and
values. As business ethicist Lynn Sharpe Paine maintains, it is a mistake “to
regard legal compliance as an adequate means for addressing the full range of
ethical issues that arise every day.”39 She continues, “[e]ven in the best cases,
legal compliance is unlikely to unleash much moral imagination or commit-
ment.”40 As a result, “[t]hose managers who define ethics as legal compliance
are implicitly endorsing a code of moral mediocrity for their organizations.”41
For these reasons, those familiar with ethics and legal compliance programs
suggest that a set of rules will be most effective if the organization fosters a
culture in which ethical behavior is valued for its own sake.
Sensitivity to the effects of a compliance program on motives and attitudes
may seem to reintroduce the threat that character will be erased from the
picture, by implying that character is ultimately just the product of environmen-
tal forces. The relationship between program features and personal disposition,
however, is more complex than this. Rather than simply producing certain
dispositions, programs with different features tend to evoke certain pre-existing
orientations. This suggests that individuals possess a mixture of instrumental
and normative motives and that either motive may predominate in a given
situation.
The work of Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite on industry regulation is
instructive on this point.42 Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that the corporate
actors whom they have studied are “bundles of contradictory commitments to
values about economic rationality, law abidingness, and business responsibility.
Business executives have profit-maximizing and law-abiding selves. At differ-
37. See Robert Cialdini, Social Influence and the Triple Tumor Structure of Organizational Dishon-
esty, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO BUSINESS ETHICS, supra note 24, at 44, 56–57.
38. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized
Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance, and the Firm, 76
TEMP. L. REV. 451, 464–75 (2003). On the importance of this phenomenon for obedience of the law in
general, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990).
39. Lynn Sharp Paine, Managing for Organizational Integrity, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1994, at
106, 109.
40. Id. at 111.
41. Id.
42. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION
DEBATE (1992).
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ent moments, in different contexts, the different selves prevail.”43 What are the
implications of this for a regulatory strategy?
B. BALANCING INSTRUMENTAL AND NORMATIVE APPROACHES
Ayres and Braithwaite observe that, on the one hand, regulation that relies
solely on moral suasion will be ineffective when actors are motivated by
economic rationality, such as concern for the bottom line. In such instances,
regulated actors will exploit the regulator’s assumption that corporate officials
are motivated simply by the desire to act responsibly. On the other hand, a
strategy based mainly on the imposition of penalties will undermine the good
will of regulated actors who do have a desire to act ethically. “When actors see
themselves as pursuing a higher calling,” Ayres and Braithwaite write, “to treat
them as driven by what they see as baser motivation insults them [and]
demotivates them.”44 They argue that “[a] crucial danger of a punitive posture
that projects negative expectations of the regulated actor is that it inhibits
self-regulation.”45 The result can be the creation of an attitude of resistance and
only grudging literal compliance with rules.
The work of Ayres and Braithwaite underscores that regulation may subtly
influence a regulated actor’s understanding of herself and her motivations. The
image of multiple selves that come to the fore under certain conditions is
consistent with situationism. At the same time, these selves seem to be expres-
sions of underlying, albeit contextual, character, in that they can influence the
outcomes that result from using different compliance strategies. Regulators
therefore must treat the particular selves that are activated under certain circum-
stances as independent variables.
Ayres and Braithwaite suggest that a system that effectively promotes ethi-
cally responsible conduct must have the capability of activating both economic
rationality and the desire to act ethically. “[W]ithout the spectre of sanctions in
the background . . . social responsibility concerns would not occupy the fore-
ground of our deliberation. In contrast, when punishment is thrust into the
foreground, it is difficult to also sustain public-regarding modes of deliberation
in the foreground.”46 They further note that “the less salient and powerful the
control technique used to secure compliance, the more likely internalization will
result.”47 By contrast, the more visible the sanctions, the more likely the party is
to attribute her compliance to external compulsion.48 As a result, Ayres and
Braithwaite believe that the optimal regulatory approach is for a regulator to
proceed at the outset on the assumption that the regulated actor desires to
behave ethically. She must be prepared to impose punishment, however, if the
43. Id. at 19.
44. Id. at 24–25.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 47.
47. Id. at 49.
48. See id.
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regulated party acts inconsistently with that assumption.49
What insights from Ayres and Braithwaite can we draw for the relationship
between legal ethics and risk management? First, law firms today have come to
resemble more explicitly the business corporations that these two scholars have
studied. Intense competition in the market for legal services has made it
imperative for law firms to adopt more sophisticated business practices in order
to remain financially viable. It therefore seems reasonable to conceptualize
lawyers as consisting partially of a profit-maximizing self that is operative in
certain situations.
If we view lawyers as regulated business actors, then we can identify at least
two types of entities who serve as regulators. One is law firms who seek to
establish and enforce risk management procedures with which lawyers are
directed to comply. The other includes “external” entities such as bar associa-
tions; government agencies like the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Department of Justice (DOJ);
and private plaintiffs, all of whom may seek to hold lawyers responsible for
ethical violations under bar rules, statute, or common law doctrine.
Second, it should be clear that the hortatory approach exemplified by the
1908 Canons and other aspirational standards cannot serve as the sole source of
ethical regulation. Whether that approach was ever effective,50 modern law
practice has become a far too explicitly commercial enterprise for it to be so
now. Too much risk exists that reliance on moral suasion will be exploited by
lawyers for whom profit maximization has become an unavoidable consider-
ation.
However, a third point that follows from Ayres and Braithwaite is the
inadvisability of relying solely on the prospect of punishment to promote ethical
behavior. Such a strategy is likely to undermine internalization of the norm of
ethical behavior as valuable for its own sake. A regime that relies solely on
sanctions and deterrence may reinforce the idea of the lawyer as the “bad man,”
whose compliance is based simply on the contingent calculations of economic
rationality.
This would be an especially unfortunate outcome because it might lead
lawyers to convey this instrumental conception of law to clients as well, thereby
further eroding belief in the intrinsic normative character of legal rules. As
Tanina Rostain has noted, “Lawyers signal their own attitude toward the legal
framework and the posture they believe a client should adopt—respectful,
disdainful, alienated, or other—through the ways they talk about law as much as
49. See id. at 19–53 (discussing the concept of the “Benign Big Gun”—speaking softly and carrying
a big stick).
50. For a suggestion that informal norms may have played a role in regulating lawyer behavior in the
absence of rules, see W. Bradley Wendel, Regulation of Lawyers Without the Code, the Rules, or the
Restatement: Or, What Do Honor and Shame Have to Do With Civil Discovery Practice?, 71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1567, 1568 (2003).
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in the specifics they impart.”51 A purely instrumental approach to law could thus
erode a valuable form of social capital.
These observations suggest a fundamental challenge of modern legal ethics:
to motivate lawyers to strive to realize broad professional aspirations, while
simultaneously minimizing violation of ethical and legal rules. Can we encour-
age aspirations while simultaneously securing compliance? What situations
create the danger that accomplishing one will compromise our ability to accom-
plish the other?
IV. CORPORATE LEGAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Research on behavior within organizations, especially as applied to corporate
legal compliance programs, has begun to yield some tentative insights that may
help answer these questions. This research suggests complex connections among
program characteristics, group dynamics, individual perceptions and motives,
and employee behavior. We will need not only to take account of these
interactions, but also to consider how the distinctiveness of law firms and the
legal profession may add another layer of complexity. The discussion below
offers a brief summary of some of the major themes that have emerged in the
research so far. It admittedly only scratches the surface on this topic and
represents but a rudimentary effort to begin this conversation. My hope, how-
ever, is that it will inspire more in-depth examination.
A. INSTRUMENTAL/DETERRENCE-BASED COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
One fairly robust finding is that aggressive compliance monitoring can have
an unfavorable effect on the motivation of agents to comply with rules. When
employees regard supervision as unreasonably pervasive and intrusive, they can
develop an adversarial attitude toward the company, its supervisors, and the
rules themselves. They may come to attribute their own compliance as moti-
vated by coercion, rather than by their own desire to act properly. In their eyes,
people act ethically because the system forces them to, not because they are
motivated to do so.52
When this perception emerges, the result ultimately may be lower rates of
compliance than would exist in the absence of close monitoring and visible
penalties. This can occur for two reasons. First, employees’ interpretation of
their compliance as motivated by external influence may “crowd out” any
tendency to attribute compliance to their own intrinsic desire to act in accor-
dance with the law. This can drain the compliance program of any inherent
moral value, so that it is conceptualized as simply a set of rules that attach
prices to certain types of behavior. It also may undermine employees’ percep-
tion of themselves as honest and ethical people who would abide by the law
51. Rostain, supra note 19, at 1336.
52. See Cialdini, supra note 37; Edward L. Deci & Richard M. Ryan, The Support of Autonomy and
the Control of Behavior, 53 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1024, 1026 (1987).
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even in the absence of monitoring. As a result, employees may violate the rules
when the probability of detection and/or the penalty is low. 53
A second reason for low compliance in a program that relies mainly on
penalties to control behavior is the implicit signal it sends about what employ-
ees can expect from their colleagues. Such a program can convey the message
that people cannot be trusted because wrongdoing is relatively common.54
Employees are less likely to comply with rules when this is the case. Compli-
ance under such circumstances tends to make people feel like “chumps” who
naively disadvantage themselves compared to others. A penalty-oriented compli-
ance program thus may destroy conditions for the emergence of social norms
that can channel behavior in desirable directions.55
Thus, for instance, expanding the focus to legal compliance by the general
public, taxpayers exposed to information suggesting that there is widespread tax
evasion may be less willing to pay their fair share of taxes.56 Paying one’s full
share in this situation is akin to cooperating in a Prisoner’s Dilemma when the
taxpayer knows that other parties are likely to defect. By contrast, publicity
about strict enforcement against specific individuals may not have the same
effect. It avoids suggesting that cheating is widespread, and can signal that the
government takes defection seriously and is willing to bear the expense of
penalizing defectors. Enforcement also reduces the number of tax evaders
whom an individual is likely to encounter. The result can be to reinforce the
sense that most people pay their fair share, which means that doing so is
unlikely to put the taxpayer at a disadvantage compared to others.
1. Lawyers and Compliance Programs
There are at least a couple of features of law practice that we may need to
take into account when considering the significance of these tendencies. First,
lawyers traditionally have seen themselves as autonomous professionals who
53. On the “crowding-out” phenomenon, see generally BRUNO S. FREY, NOT JUST FOR THE MONEY: AN
ECONOMIC THEORY OF PERSONAL MOTIVATION 7–39 (1997); Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The
Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746
(1997).
54. See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision Frames, and
Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 688 (1999).
55. On the potential for destruction of social norms by legal rules, see generally Richard H. Pildes,
The Destruction of Social Capital Through Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2055 (1996). The literature on the
operation of social norms and their interaction with law is of course legion, with various different
theories on the nature of the interaction. For a sampling, see ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991); ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Sympo-
sium: Law, Economics, and Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996); Symposium: The Legal Construc-
tion of Norms, 86 VA. L. REV. 1577 (2000); Symposium: Norms and Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1607 (2001). For an effort to “develop principles of theory acceptance—a metatheory—for theories of
social norms as they relate to law,” see W. Bradley Wendel, Mixed Signals: Rational-Choice Theories
of Social Norms and the Pragmatics of Explanation, 77 IND. L.J. 1, 39–56 (2002).
56. See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1469 (2003) (discussing several studies focusing on the influence
of other taxpayers’ attitudes toward the tax system upon the individual taxpayer’s ultimate compliance).
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should be subject to minimal external influence.57 The reality has not always
matched the image, but this remains a strong component of professional iden-
tity. Lawyers therefore may be especially sensitive to what they perceive as
intrusive monitoring—perhaps quicker to construe supervision as excessive and
to be more resistant to it. This may make them especially susceptible to the
“crowding out” phenomenon, and thus more likely than others to approach rule
compliance instrumentally.
Lawyers’ professional training may make adoption of this attitude especially
problematic. Lawyers are adept at creative interpretation of rules and at fashion-
ing plausible arguments in support of their interpretations. This may enable
them more than other people to convince themselves that they are not violating
a given rule, thus reducing any psychological dissonance that they might feel by
engaging in certain behavior in the absence of this rationalization.58 The result
is that a lawyer may not have to work as hard as a non-lawyer to justify acting
in a way that a more detached observer would characterize as a rule violation.
A second feature of law practice relevant to compliance is that a lawyer who
bristles at what she perceives as intrusive monitoring may be in more of a
position than a non-lawyer to respond by leaving her employer. A law firm’s
assets consist mainly of relationships with clients, but individual lawyers in
many cases are able to leave the firm and take those assets with them. The
lateral market for lawyers thus may make it even more difficult for law firms
than other employers to implement a compliance program that relies on penal-
ties to influence behavior. When exit is an easy option, there may be less
incentive to abide by rules that one regards as intrusive. Combined with what
may be lawyers’ tendency to find offensive a measure of supervision that
non-lawyers might not, the bargaining leverage provided by the lateral market
may lead law firms to adopt relatively mild measures that fail to detect much
misconduct and result in only minor penalties when they do.
Research suggests that when this occurs, there will be less compliance than if
the firm adopted no system of sanctions at all.59 This counterintuitive outcome
reflects the role that compliance program characteristics play in framing employ-
ees’ perceptions of situations in which they must make decisions. Frames
influence “not only the perception of what type of behavior is proper but also
expectations of what others will do, what norms are applicable, and what kinds
of attributions about others are justified.”60 They are activated by a variety of
57. See Davis, supra note 4, at 3 (“The hallmark of lawyers before the advance of the large firm was
their sense of independent professionalism. Whether they worked alone or in firms, they prized their
independence.”); Regan, supra note 5, at 34–36 (“This aspiration to independence is expressed in the
statement that the lawyer is an ‘officer of the legal system,’ who bears some responsibility for ensuring
the integrity of the legal process.”).
58. The classic statement of cognitive dissonance theory is LEON FESTINGER, THEORY OF COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE (1957).
59. See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
60. Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 54, at 687.
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subtle cues, some of which may seem trivial to an outside observer.
2. Economic Frames and Compliance
One frame that persons use is a “business” or “economic” frame. This
focuses on maximizing utility by avoiding penalties and obtaining rewards.61 A
person employing this frame essentially uses a cost-benefit analysis to choose a
course of behavior. By contrast, an “ethical” frame emphasizes moral consider-
ations that can have categorical force, reducing the likelihood of weighing costs
against benefits.62 Which frame is activated thus can determine not only what
behavior is chosen but why. A person who frames a decision as economic in
nature may decide to comply with a rule because on balance it is rewarding to
do so, while a person who regards the situation as calling for an ethical decision
may choose compliance because doing so is an expression of the right thing to do.
One of the cues that signal which frame is appropriate is the existence of a
compliance program that relies significantly on surveillance and sanctions to
induce appropriate behavior. Such a program tends to elicit a business frame
when there is no information that permits a person to form expectations about
others’ behavior.63 The latter type of information is powerful for the reasons
described above: people are more likely to cooperate—or restrain themselves in
accordance with rules—when they believe that others will as well. When they
do not have enough information to make this prediction, the presence of
surveillance and sanctions can serve as a proxy for it. Research indicates that a
system with these features can signal that people generally cannot be trusted
and require the threat of penalties in order to act correctly. The expectation that
others are unlikely to cooperate in turn leads an individual to focus on her own
self-interest, and to frame the situation with an eye toward what choices will
further it.
Framing explains why a program with weak sanctions can produce less
compliance than one with no sanctions at all. Ordinarily we would assume that
adding costs to the noncompliance alternative would increase, rather than
reduce, compliant behavior. A surveillance and sanction system, however, prompts
a focus on the business aspects of a decision. This in turn elicits cost-benefit
calculation of the desirability of cooperation or compliance. When costs of
defection or noncompliance are relatively low, this calculation will indicate that
defection/noncompliance is the appropriate behavior. In terms of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, there is no dominant strategy in the business frame. Whether to
cooperate or defect is contingent on the costs and rewards of doing so in a
particular instance.
61. See id. at 688; David M. Messick, Alternative Logics for Decision Making in Social Settings, 38
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 11, 26 (1999).
62. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 54, at 688; Messick, supra note 61, at 14.
63. See Tenbrunsel & Messick, supra note 54, at 693.
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3. Ethical Frames and Compliance
By contrast, the dominant strategy for a person using an ethical frame is to
cooperate/comply because that behavior is regarded as valuable in its own right.
This orientation eschews cost-benefit analysis, and therefore is not sensitive to
the strength or weakness of sanctions.64 Thus, we see the explanation for the
apparent paradox. The absence of a surveillance and sanctions program may
elicit an ethical deliberative frame, which is likely to result in compliance. The
presence of such a program may evoke a business frame, in which weak
sanctions lead to a significant amount of noncompliance.
This logic suggests that the likelihood of compliance is enhanced by either a
program without sanctions or a program with a heavy dose of them. The basis
for the behavior is different in each instance, however. In Prisoner’s Dilemma
terms, “[w]hen no sanctions are present, individuals cooperate because it is the
ethical action to take. When strong sanctions are present, individuals cooperate
because it is the more profitable business strategy.”65 Thus, “while there are no
ethical reasons for defecting, there very well may be business reasons for
cooperating.”66
These conclusions suggest that firms may achieve compliance in different
ways, based on what we might call either intrinsic or extrinsic motivation to
comply. Different audiences may vary in their receptiveness to each kind of
appeal. Focusing again on the tax context, for instance, we see that adherence to
a norm of compliance appears to be related to the opportunities available to
evade taxes.67 Taxpayers with primarily wage and investment income have
fewer opportunities than taxpayers who are self-employed. The former histori-
cally have had significantly higher rates of compliance than the latter.68
For wage and investment taxpayers, a compliance strategy that emphasizes
the widespread practice of fulfilling tax obligations is likely to reinforce the
belief that paying one’s fair share of taxes is an intrinsically ethical obligation.
In addition, stressing that the government does aggressively pursue the minority
of citizens who cheat on their taxes fosters the expectation that most people will
abide by the law and those who attempt to free ride will be caught and
punished. Enforcement can help ensure a critical mass of compliant tax payers,
thereby increasing the robustness of the compliance norm by minimizing expo-
sure to persons who engage in tax evasion.69
64. Id. at 699 (“[W]hen an ethical frame is evoked, cooperation should be the dominant choice,
independent of the presence or absence of a sanctioning system and the expected cost of the
sanctions.”).
65. Id. at 700.
66. Id. at 702.
67. See Lederman, supra note 56, at 1508 (“A survey of Minnesota taxpayers found that normative
beliefs about tax compliance are related to opportunity to evade.”).
68. Id. at 1500.
69. Id. at 1500–03. For a suggestion of how deterrence and a norm of compliance can be intertwined
in the tax context, see John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic
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These measures can strengthen a norm of compliance for a group who is
already inclined to embrace that norm, in part because they have few opportuni-
ties to cheat in any event. Taxpayers whose opportunities are so constrained that
they have little choice but to pay their required share thus can interpret their
behavior as motivated by the desire to act legally. The perception that others
will be punished for cheating reduces the likelihood that their interpretation will
be undermined by fear that paying the required tax is actually a foolish choice
that will disadvantage them compared to others.
By contrast, “the tendency towards a group norm of evasion among the
self-employed,” combined with the belief that others are likely to engage in
evasion, may require more aggressive sanctions that reduce opportunities for
noncompliance.70 If successful, this approach may limit opportunities enough
that a norm of compliance may emerge. This norm would be reinforced both by
the constraints on tax evasion and by the perception that the number of other
self-employed taxpayers who cheat is low.71
The possible value of a program that combines norm-based and sanction-
based features finds support in studies that indicate that increased audit rates
and higher sanctions do not necessarily lower tax compliance by “crowding
out” intrinsic motivation to comply.72 This suggests that a compliance program
may be able to trigger the use of an ethical frame for one segment of the target
audience while eliciting a business frame for another segment. One consider-
ation in determining which approach to use for which group may be the
opportunities that various groups have to evade the rules.
4. Compliance Programs as Insurance
A final consideration in assessing corporate compliance programs is that
organizations may effectively treat them as insurance, investing only in the
amount of compliance necessary to shift liability or the costs of misconduct
from the firm to its employees.73 Under the Organizational Sentencing Guide-
lines, for instance, as well as the policies of certain government agencies, a
company whose employees have acted illegally may gain certain benefits if it
has in place an effective legal compliance program: A prosecutor may decline to
bring charges against the company as an entity, the organization may introduce
the existence of such a program as part of its defense, and an effective program
may reduce the penalties that are ultimately imposed on the company.74
Basis of Citizenship Behavior, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 490, 508–09 (1995) (finding that a taxpayer’s sense
of duty affects his analysis of the risk of cheating and suggesting that increased enforcement might fail
to increase compliance if it leads to a decreased sense of duty and thus a lower perception of risk).
70. Lederman, supra note 56, at 1508.
71. Id. at 1508–10.
72. See generally id.
73. See generally William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compli-
ance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (1999).
74. For an overview of these practices, see Kimberly D. Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct:
Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571, 584 (2005). See also William S. Laufer,
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An organization that treats its compliance program as an insurance policy
will find it rational to incur expenses for such a program only up to the point at
which it will be deemed sufficiently effective to gain lenient treatment for the
organization.75 Given the difficulty of determining whether a compliance pro-
gram is effective, companies may enhance the likelihood of receiving these
benefits simply by establishing programs with certain formal features.76 This
creates a moral hazard that the company will be indifferent to the risks created
by its agents once such a program is in place, since only those agents, and not
the firm, will suffer any loss resulting from the risky behavior. In consequence,
“[t]he purchase of compliance sufficient to shift the risk of liability and loss, in
certain firms, has the effect of decreasing levels of care.”77 A company that
conceives of ethics as a matter of risk management therefore may work from
within a business frame, taking a narrow self-interested approach that undermo-
tivates its employees to behave ethically.
To date, law firms have not sought to rely on risk management programs to
argue for lenient treatment. They may face fewer occasions to do so, since, for
various reasons, their lawyers are rarely the targets of criminal investigations. In
New York and New Jersey—the only states that authorize disciplinary actions
against law firms as entities—however, firms are able to defend against such
actions by establishing that they had in place reasonable programs designed to
ensure ethical behavior by their lawyers.78 Furthermore, the possibility of
enforcement actions by government agencies against firms may increase with
the enactment of SEC rules governing lawyers and more aggressive IRS pursuit
of tax shelters. Firms faced with such actions, as well as those that are
defendants in private civil litigation, may draw an analogy to the corporate
Integrity, Diligence, and the Limits of Good Corporate Citizenship, 34 AM. BUS. L.J. 157, 163–66
(1996).
75. See generally Laufer, supra note 73.
76. On the difficulty of evaluating the effectiveness of these programs, see Krawiec, supra note 74,
at 580 (“[C]ourts and agencies are unlikely to possess the ability to differentiate effective internal
compliance structures from cosmetic ones—that is, those structures designed to create the illusion of
compliance for purposes of avoiding legal liability, rather than for the purpose of deterring miscon-
duct.”); Donald C. Langevoort, The Behavioral Economics of Corporate Compliance With Law, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 112–14 (arguing that after an illegality is discovered, there is a bias toward
determining that monitoring was insufficient and that an effective inquiry into the compliance program
“would require extensive and subjective expert research into the culture and operations of the firm”);
Laufer, supra note 73, at 1417–18 (questioning the capacity of courts to evaluate the effectiveness and
authenticity of compliance programs and noting corporations’ awareness of this deficiency). In determin-
ing which formal features to adopt, companies may look to sources such as the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission, which publishes guidelines for programs
focused on matters such as Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Controls. See http://
www.coso.org (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
77. Laufer, supra note 73, at 1415.
78. See N.J. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a) (2006) (law firms must make “reasonable efforts to
ensure that member lawyers conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct”); N.Y. CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-104(a) (2006) (law firms must “make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers
in the firm conform to the disciplinary rules”).
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sector in arguing that they should receive benefits from having in place an
effective ethical compliance program. If this becomes the primary rationale for
adoption of such a program, it raises the specter of moral hazard that I have
described above.
B. INTEGRITY-BASED COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
Concern about some of the problems with compliance programs that empha-
size surveillance and sanctions has led some observers to call for an “integrity-
based” approach to ethics. This approach attempts to reduce reliance on rules
and rule-following as the basis for ethical conduct. As one proponent argues:
[T]he goal of [many compliance] programs is to prevent, detect, and punish
legal violations. But organizational ethics means more than avoiding illegal
practice; and providing employers with a rule book will do little to address the
problems underlying unlawful conduct. To foster a climate that encourages
exemplary behavior, corporations need a comprehensive approach that goes
beyond the often punitive legal compliance stance.79
1. Fostering Values
The premise of an integrity-based approach is the importance of “self-
governance in accordance with a set of guiding principles”80—both for the
organization as a whole and for individuals within it. Management furthers such
a process by accepting the responsibility “to define and give life to an organiza-
tion’s guiding values, to create an environment that supports ethically sound
behavior, and to instill a sense of shared accountability among employees.”81
Steps essential to this task include widely communicating the importance of
values that employees take seriously and can accept; demonstrating top manage-
ment’s commitment to the values and its willingness to make decisions in
accordance with them; integrating values into the everyday decision-making
process regarding matters such as strategic plans, the pursuit of business
opportunities, the allocation of resources, the measurement of performance, and
promotion and compensation; ensuring the generation of information that en-
ables employees to incorporate values in decision-making; establishing report-
ing relationships that provide alternate perspectives necessary for objective
decisions; and equipping managers with the skills and knowledge necessary to
make ethically sound decisions.82
An integrity-based approach thus attempts to substitute persuasion for moni-
toring as the most salient mechanism for inducing ethical behavior. It is
premised on the belief that intrinsic motivation is a powerful influence on
79. Paine, supra note 39, at 106.
80. See id. at 111 (differentiating the compliance regimes from the integrity-based approach that
holds organizations to a higher standard).
81. Id.
82. See id. at 112 (presenting “The Hallmarks of an Effective Integration Strategy”).
2006] 1977RISKY BUSINESS
behavior. In order to elicit this motivation, the organization seeks to signal to
employees that it trusts them to do the right thing. Making surveillance and
sanctions a less prominent and intrusive presence in daily work life is intended
to send this signal. The theory is that if employees see management and fellow
employees behaving consistently with the values that the organization has
articulated, they are likely to follow suit. An integrity-based approach thus is
willing to accept a less aggressive compliance enforcement strategy as the price
for creating conditions in which intrinsic motivation and social norms can
operate to produce ethical behavior.
2. Discretion and Ethical Judgment
Theoretically, granting agents more discretion can help them cultivate the
capacity to deliberate autonomously on ethical issues. Individuals subject to
specific prescriptions for behavior that allow little room for discretion may not
come to grips with their moral agency nor acknowledge responsibility for their
actions.83 In William Simon’s terms, being closely tethered to rules inclines
them to engage in “categorical” rather than “contextual” reasoning.84 Rather
than consider and balance a wide range of considerations in light of their
contribution to underlying values, such agents confine themselves to determin-
ing whether the literal terms of narrow rules apply to the situation at hand.
There is enough support for the position that lawyers should confine them-
selves to categorical reasoning that Simon calls it the “Dominant View.”85 There
also, however, is a robust tradition that criticizes the dominant view as unduly
narrow. In this tradition, a lawyer is sensitive not simply to the letter of the law
but to its underlying spirit and purposes as well.86 As Robert Gordon expresses
this view with respect to corporate representation, the lawyer
may not act in furtherance of his client’s interest in ways that ultimately
frustrate, sabotage, or nullify the public purposes of the laws—or that injure
the interests of clients, which are hypothetically constructed, as all public
corporations should be, as good citizens who internalize legal norms and wish
to act in furtherance of the public values they express.87
83. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry
into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV. 477, 478–80 (1995) (noting that the
constraining power of the state and institutionalized corporate relationships result in “an abrogation of
moral autonomy and a corresponding denial of moral responsibility”).
84. WILLIAM SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS 74 (1998) (asserting that
a lawyer’s mechanical adherence to rules “categorical” norms as opposed to “contextual” norms).
85. See id. at 7 (describing the “Dominant View” as one in which counsel zealously represents any
client interest).
86. See, e.g., id. at 8 (describing the “Public Interest View”); see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY xvii (1988) (asserting that a lawyer’s role is to make laws “more just” and
clients “more public spirited”); DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 2 (2000) (arguing for an increased adherence to public interest in the legal profession).
87. Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN.
L. REV. 1185, 1207 (2003).
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There is not enough space here to discuss in detail the debate over the
appropriate scope of the lawyer’s role. Suffice it to say that those who believe
that lawyers should engage in contextual rather than simply categorical reason-
ing will find integrity-based programs promising not only because they may
produce rule compliance, but because they also may afford opportunities for
persons to develop the capacity for expansive ethical deliberation.
In sum, discretion is not only inevitable in any compliance system but may be
necessary for development of the ability to further its ultimate concerns. In
some cases, adherence to the strict terms of a rule may best further ethical
values; in others, the exercise of some discretion will be the best way to do so.
John Gellene was misguided, for instance, to the extent that he concluded that
literal compliance was not necessary with Bankruptcy Rule 2014’s requirement
that he disclose Milbank Tweed’s representation of South Street.88 As I have
suggested, he may have reasoned that there was no serious danger that his
representation of Bucyrus would be compromised by Milbank’s tie to South
Street, and that any conflict was a “technical” rather than a “substantive” one.89
Rule 2014 is explicitly intended, however, to foreclose the exercise of discretion
by attorneys.90 Such discretion too easily can result in self-serving rationaliza-
tions for nondisclosure that pose a danger to the integrity of bankruptcy
proceedings.91
By contrast, consider the formation of the Chewco special purpose entity by
Enron in late 1997.92 Chewco was created to participate as a partner with Enron
in an energy venture.93 While Enron officers and employees invested in Chewco,
that entity did not have to be included in Enron’s financial statements if outside
investors contributed three percent of its equity.94 Enron informed its attorneys
that it was considering permitting the company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO),
Andrew Fastow, to invest in Chewco.95 The attorneys advised Enron officials
that Fastow was considered an “executive officer” of Enron under SEC regula-
tions, and that his participation therefore would have to be disclosed in the
company’s public filings.96
After some delay, Enron substituted William Kopper for Fastow.97 Kopper
was a vice-president in the business unit that Fastow headed and a direct
88. See REGAN, supra note 33, at 322–24 (stating that various external influences pushed Gellene
away from the required disclosure).
89. Id. at 333–34.
90. See id. at 333–38 (describing noncompliance with Rule 2014 as a “calculated gamble”).
91. See id. at 334 (noting that Gellene rationalized his nondisclosure despite knowing the “letter of
the rule” required it).
92. See generally Milton C. Regan, Jr., Teaching Enron, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1139, 1238–43 (2005)
(providing the details of Enron’s dealings with Chewco).
93. See id. at 1238.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1239.
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subordinate of the CFO. Enron’s understanding at that time was that Kopper
was not an “executive officer” of Enron and that his participation therefore need
not be disclosed in company’s securities filings.98 Even if this were true, there is
a strong argument that failing to disclose the involvement of Kopper, given his
dependence on Fastow’s goodwill, was inconsistent with the purpose of the
SEC regulation. That provision is intended to alert investors to top manage-
ment’s involvement in arrangements that could pose a conflict of interest. An
attorney engaging in contextual rather than categorical deliberation therefore
could conclude that the literal terms of the regulation were not dispositive, and
that Enron should disclose Kopper’s participation. As the Gellene and Chewco
examples illustrate, robust ethical judgment calls for a kind of “meta-discretion”
to determine when it is appropriate to exercise discretion. An integrity-based
approach tries to create opportunities for agents to develop this capacity.
3. Potential Pitfalls
Despite its potential benefits, relying on an organizational integrity strategy
may also involve certain risks. First, articulating a set of values may be intended
as simply an inexpensive public relations substitute for a concerted ethics
program. As Donald Langevoort has observed, “Because these programs have
become so commonplace, few firms can afford to depart from the norm,
whatever their level of internal commitment to it.”99 As a result, it may be
difficult to differentiate effective from ineffective—or, worse, insincere—
integrity-based programs.
A second potential difficulty is related to the first. It is crucial for employees
to believe that management takes seriously the values that it proclaims. It may
be difficult, however, for them to determine if this is so. One factor that can
signal sincerity is the willingness of senior management to model the kind of
conduct they are trying to persuade employees to engage in. As Langevoort
suggests, however, this may not be enough if employees are subject to perfor-
mance incentives in which ethical behavior is likely to put one at a disadvan-
tage.100 This can occur, for instance, if the organization uses a “highly competitive
tournament and quota system for salespeople in which pecuniary rewards are
heavily skewed to the top performers and laggards are dealt with harshly.”101
In this instance, it is clear that “the incentives skew against the values
message.”102 The result may be that employees either regard the company’s
commitment to ethical values as unrealistic or as insincere window-dressing
that is subordinate to bottom-line objectives.103 In neither case will employees
98. Id.
99. Langevoort, supra note 76, at 106.
100. Id. at 107–10.
101. Id. at 107.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 107–10. Some firms may in fact benefit from a culture of risk-taking that sometimes
flirts with the edge of legality and will not want to constrain agents unduly from engaging in such
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be motivated to take ethical pronouncements seriously. Langevoort therefore
concludes that “[h]ighly competitive industries, especially those with ‘tourna-
ment’-oriented compensation structures, will have a hard time implementing an
integrity system.”104
Finally, we have to consider whether the easing of surveillance and penalties
that accompany an integrity-based approach is likely to result in a weak
sanctioning system that produces less compliance than a system with either
strong sanctions or none. Even if there is a sufficiently visible set of sanctions to
elicit a business frame for deliberation, the sanctions may be so low that the
cost-benefit calculation only rarely leads to the conclusion that ethical behavior
is profitable. Organizational leaders who find an integrity approach attractive
therefore will have to determine how to structure their compliance program so
that it does not result in this worst of all possible worlds.
4. Integrity-Based Programs and Law Firms
On the one hand, an integrity-based approach seems appealing to law firms in
light of the traditional ideals of lawyer independence and autonomy, as well as
the profession’s emphasis on the importance of good judgment. Furthermore, it
is consistent with the aspiration that lawyers will orient themselves in terms of
greater ethical values rather than simply aiming to comply with rules and avoid
liability.
Law firms also may have an advantage in being able to draw upon a set of
ethical values distinctive to the legal profession, as opposed to more diffuse
values drawn from ordinary morality. These have the potential to provide a
common vocabulary for both the articulation of values and efforts to infuse
legal practice with an appreciation of them. Given the greater specialization of
the bar, the salience of these values in daily practice may require translation of
them by practice groups and specialized bar groups into an even more refined
vocabulary, which provides instruction on the distinctive dilemmas that lawyers
in a particular field of practice tend to face.
On the other hand, one can’t help but think that we’ve been down this road
before. The 1908 Canons, as well as the Canons and Ethical Considerations of
the 1969 Code, sought to express broad principles that were supposed to guide
lawyers in their exercise of discretion.105 The Code, of course, sought to
balance these with enforceable rules. The Code was replaced by the Model
Rules in 1983, however, because of the conclusion in many quarters that the
Canons and Ethical Considerations were vacuous and ineffective.106 Critics
argued that relying on broad principles with minimal sanctions failed to moti-
behavior. See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec, Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the “Rogue Trader”
Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301 (2001). Securities trading firms may be an example of companies that
benefit from such an entrepreneurial culture. See generally id.
104. Langevoort, supra note 76, at 111 n.86.
105. See text accompanying notes 11–14.
106. See text accompanying note 17.
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vate ethical behavior, and that a strategy that focused exclusively on enforceable
rules was necessary in order to provide the proper incentives.107
Furthermore, the specific values that have been posited as distinctive to the
legal profession are in some tension, and there has never been a robust consen-
sus about how lawyers should accommodate them. The Preamble to the Model
Rules acknowledges this. It declares that a lawyer is “a representative of clients,
an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special responsibility
for the quality of justice.”108 These roles, the Preamble suggests, “are usually
harmonious,” but “[i]n the nature of law practice . . . conflicting responsibilities
are encountered.”109 The most significant tension, of course, is between the idea
that a lawyer is simply a neutral advocate and that she has some duties to the
larger legal system beyond the interests of the client. The bitter conflict on this
issue suggests that there may be limits to firms’ abilities to invoke ideals of the
legal profession in the pursuit of an integrity-based program.
Finally, has the movement among law firms toward “eat what you kill”
compensation and a perpetual tournament of partners created conditions inimi-
cal to the success of an approach based on integrity? Major partners might be
able to model the behavior they hope to encourage by, for example, forgoing
some of the compensation to which they are entitled or refusing on principle to
deliver certain kinds of opinion letters. They also might encourage pro bono
work by crediting the hours spent on it toward the calculation of billable hours.
How much difference will such measures make, however, if compensation is
based primarily on revenue generation and the firm is willing to increase profits
per partner by expelling partners who do not meet a given revenue target? At a
minimum, the research that I have described suggests that firms who desire to
adopt an integrity approach must think carefully about the complex relation-
ships among the firm’s policies and procedures on the one hand and attorneys’
incentives and perceptions on the other.
CONCLUSION
Professor Alfieri has rendered valuable service by emphasizing the need to
scrutinize the implicit cognitive and moral universe that risk management both
reflects and shapes. This Essay is a modest response to the call to begin this task
in earnest. I have suggested that we need to draw upon research on the
psychological dynamics of organizational life, to examine the application of this
research to corporate compliance efforts, and to develop an understanding of the
ways in which the nature of law firms as distinctive business enterprises should
inform our assessment of the relevance of this body of work.
One point worth keeping in mind as we engage in this work is that corpora-
107. See text accompanying notes 17–20.
108. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl., reprinted in REGULATION OF LAWYERS, supra note 11, at
9.
109. Id. at 11.
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tions and law firms may be converging on the same point from diametrically
opposite directions. The prevailing approach to regulating corporate behavior
for over a century has been reliance on deterrence through the manipulation of
incentives.110 By contrast, the dominant approach to regulating lawyer behavior
over roughly the same period has been reliance on appeals to internalized
values.111 Recent work on corporate regulation emphasizes the inadequacy of
relying solely on deterrence and the importance of an internalized value of
compliance.112 Recent work on lawyer regulation has underscored the limits of
relying on faith in lawyers’ values and the importance of sanctions in shaping
incentives.113
Human motivation and behavior are complicated enough that neither propo-
nents of shaping incentives through rules nor proponents of fostering the
internalization of norms through appeals to values are likely to have the last
word. Ideally, a regulatory regime will build on the strengths of each, although
doing so successfully can be a delicate task.114 As a relatively recent entrant into
the realm of sanctions and incentives, however, lawyer regulation might be
prudent in not overreacting to the limitations of a compliance approach. We
need more time to evaluate its potential in this arena, and to assess how it might
best work in tandem with an appeal to values.
In particular, for good reasons, risk management is here to stay. Law firms are
only now beginning to move away from the “cottage industry” model of
practice and to recognize the impact of organizational structure, policies, and
procedures on the behavior of lawyers within the firm. At least in the short term,
law firms’ belated attention to these factors likely will take the form of adopting
measures to ensure legal compliance and avoid legal risks. Finally, we need to
consider how to take account of the emerging work on situationist moral
psychology that suggests that character is less global, and circumstances are
more influential, than we conventionally believe.115 This research requires that
we assess more critically the reliance in many quarters on virtue ethics as the
foundation for promoting desirable conduct by lawyers.116 Doing so may shed
110. For a discussion of the role of corporate liability in shaping incentives for legal compliance, see
Deborah A. DeMott, Organizational Incentives to Care About the Law, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39
(1997).
111. See text accompanying notes 11–14 (discussing aspirations as basis for regulating lawyer’s
conduct).
112. See text accompanying notes 52–56.
113. See text accompanying notes 33–39.
114. For one effort to analyze the respective contributions of these and other approaches, see Linda
Klebe Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works and What Hurts, 41 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 131 (1999). The authors concluded that both integrity-based and compliance-based
approaches were significantly associated with positive behavioral outcomes in the six companies they
studied and that the two were not mutually exclusive. See id. at 138–39. An integrity-based focus,
however, had a stronger relationship to such outcomes than a compliance focus. See id. at 138.
115. See supra Part II.A.
116. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
11–162 (1993).
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light on how a compliance approach can be used most effectively.
It is too soon to say how law firm ethics programs might take account of
these considerations. It is not too soon, however, to stress that it is important not
simply that lawyers avoid ethical lapses but that they practice in ways that give
meaning to professional aspirations such as promoting justice, preserving the
integrity of the legal system, and fostering respect for the rule of law. The task
ahead is to ensure that lawyers remain bilingual: fluent in the language of risk,
while appreciating that another language is necessary to express more expansive
conceptions of legal ethics for which risk has no vocabulary.
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